Suchergebnisse

Literature has an inherent authenticity as an input for language teaching. Literary texts carry with them sociolinguistic and pragmatic knowledge which is pivotal for language learners to have their communicative competence increased. This study investigates the effect of the text of poetry on the pragmatic competence and fluency of ESL students. This is an experimental study consisting of a control group (CG) and an experimental group (EG). The respondents of the study are students of the 3rd semester, Education Faculty, University of Malakand, Pakistan. Before the commencement of the experiment, a speaking-type pretest was administered to students of both groups. Afterward, the control group was taught through traditional teaching materials whereas the experimental group was treated with poetry as teaching materials. At the end of the six-week-long experiment, a posttest like the pretest was again conducted. Moreover, a semi-structured interview was also conducted after the experiment. The scores of the students of both the groups on pretest and posttest were analyzed through statistical tests. The results of the tests indicated that the students of the experimental group performed significantly better than that of the control group in fluency whereas there was no significant difference in the mean scores of both the groups regarding pragmatic competence. However, the students of the experimental group registered significant improvement in pragmatic competence on posttest in intragroup comparison. The thematic analysis of the interview showed that the learners of the CG were reluctant to express themselves freely. They did not take interest in the group activities and did not actively participate in the presentation activity. On the contrary, the learners of EG were provided with a free-of-fear speaking environment due to the ambiguity and the subjective nature of poetry. Moreover, the text of the poetry was motivating and led to lengthy and intimate interaction among the students of the experimental group thereby improving their fluency. The study recommends that literary texts may be utilized in ESL classrooms.

In South Asia, India-Pakistan nuclear equation faces an intricate stability/instability paradox under the shadow of pervasive non-state actors. These actors are exploited by the bellicose nuclear rivals and used as proxies to bleed each other. The terrorist incidents may lead to a crisis that could escalate to the nuclear level. The ambitious belligerents—India and Pakistan—are embroiled in a vicious nuclear and conventional arms race. In conjunction, both lack any effective conflict resolution mechanism. Though, past strategic crises were managed beneath the panic of nuclear escalation and intervention by the international community. What if such a crisis develops again if a spectacular terrorist attack occurs, especially in mainland India. Indian decision-makers could castigate Pakistan by contemplating so-called surgical strikes under the impression that Pakistan has launched terrorists against India. This research paper critically analyzes how non-state actors and their use in sub-conventional warfare pose severe repercussions for nuclear deterrence stability in the absence of credible nuclear escalation control measures between India and Pakistan.

The interplay of several international, regional, and local factors poses daunting challenges for deterrence stability in South Asia. The emerging revolution in the military affairs compounded with prolonged crises vis-à-vis the absence of any conflict resolution mechanism between India and Pakistan; the nuclear deterrence is budding a fragile relationship between the two nuclear-armed pugnacious belligerents of South Asia. The Indian aspirations to accumulate maximum power based on its strategic partnerships with the technologically advanced countries in the world are characterized by the classic Indian strategic thinking to establish its leadership in the region. At the same time, Pakistan's reliance on China in its quests for acquiring military hardware required for the deterrence equation seemingly remains insatiable within the framework of the stability–instability paradox. Without a holistic analysis of the political and strategic challenges, casus belli of the crises, and nuclear command and control systems dynamics between the two, it would amount to a petitio principii to draw theoretical assumptions. Therefore, this study attempts to comprehensively explain the phenomena by analyzing the challenges of nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia at different levels.

In South Asia, India-Pakistan nuclear equation faces an intricate stability/instability paradox under the shadow of pervasive non-state actors. These actors are exploited by the bellicose nuclear rivals and used as proxies to bleed each other. The terrorist incidents may lead to a crisis that could escalate to the nuclear level. The ambitious belligerents—India and Pakistan—are embroiled in a vicious nuclear and conventional arms race. In conjunction, both lack any effective conflict resolution mechanism. Though, past strategic crises were managed beneath the panic of nuclear escalation and intervention by the international community. What if such a crisis develops again if a spectacular terrorist attack occurs, especially in mainland India. Indian decision-makers could castigate Pakistan by contemplating so-called surgical strikes under the impression that Pakistan has launched terrorists against India. This research paper critically analyzes how non-state actors and their use in sub-conventional warfare pose severe repercussions for nuclear deterrence stability in the absence of credible nuclear escalation control measures between India and Pakistan.

The interplay of several international, regional, and local factors poses daunting challenges for deterrence stability in South Asia. The emerging revolution in the military affairs compounded with prolonged crises vis-à-vis the absence of any conflict resolution mechanism between India and Pakistan; the nuclear deterrence is budding a fragile relationship between the two nuclear-armed pugnacious belligerents of South Asia. The Indian aspirations to accumulate maximum power based on its strategic partnerships with the technologically advanced countries in the world are characterized by the classic Indian strategic thinking to establish its leadership in the region. At the same time, Pakistan's reliance on China in its quests for acquiring military hardware required for the deterrence equation seemingly remains insatiable within the framework of the stability–instability paradox. Without a holistic analysis of the political and strategic challenges, casus belli of the crises, and nuclear command and control systems dynamics between the two, it would amount to a petitio principii to draw theoretical assumptions. Therefore, this study attempts to comprehensively explain the phenomena by analyzing the challenges of nuclear deterrence stability in South Asia at different levels.

The relationship between the nuclear arms race and strategic stability has been important for scholars, politicians, and journalists who have shown keen interest in what causes a state to augment its military power and its effects on its rivalries with other states. As emerging technologies continue to change the security calculus of the states, the arms race is on for investing in the development and acquisition of offensive and defensive technologies in South Asia. The Indian strategic cooperation with the technologically advanced countries and the increase in the defense budget confirm its military modernization while upsetting the delicacies of the conventional military balance in South Asia. This study gives a substantive background to the developments and technological advancements in the post overt nuclearization era (1998) in the context of complications posed by India's persistent animus dominandi to outpace Pakistan in an anarchic structure vis-à-vis its impact on strategic instability in South Asia by making a comprehensive analysis of an unending arms race for the maintenance of credible minimum deterrence.

This paper assists in understanding contesting technological capabilities and doctrinal modification between India and Pakistan that are drifting South Asia towards instability, leaving the nuclear deterrence in a dark abyss. Hawks on both sides of the nuclear armed rivals are unprecedentedly chanting threats of nuclear war. More bothersome is the indications of shifting the Indian policy of No First Use (NFU), calls for doctrinal modifications and counterforce temptations. An Indian quest for escalation dominance and Pakistani quest for stability against India is in fact a mutual struggle beyond 'minimum credible' to 'assured second strike' capabilities.

This article seeks to discuss Pakistan's nuclear doctrine and its significance for strategic stability in South Asia which is challenged by complex interactions between different players in political, military, and technological dynamics. In particular, India's easy access to technology and the challenges for Pakistan associated with fears of low-intensity conflicts due to Indian offensive strategies have resulted in dangerous instabilities. The Indian technological advancement has inevitably brought revolutionary changes in the strategic thought process thus continuously forcing Pakistan to modify or upgrade its nuclear doctrine. We argue that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is ambiguous, and the changing contours of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine are within the framework of how technological advancement navigates strategic stability in the South Asian region.

In contrast to the pervasive confidence that the development of nuclear weapons ensures peace and stability by making wars too expensive to fight for, South Asian strategic stability has drifted into nasty security competition through arms race with an episodical crisis that continues at the sub-conventional level. Deterrence studies that were relegated to the bins of history soon after the end of the Cold War received a renewed interest of scholars on the subject since the demonstration of deterrent capabilities by South Asian rivals in 1998. A new wave of deterrence studies has developed in the current multipolar world with some scholars adopting Cold War models of analysis in the contemporary realms of South Asia, whereas other are attempting new analytical approaches. This article aims to offer a fresh look at how to provide a clear concept of strategic stability, how strategic stability is applicable in contemporary South Asia and what the recent crisis between India and Pakistan being interwoven with terrorism tells us about crisis stability between the two countries under the shadows of nuclear weapons.

This article seeks to discuss Pakistan's nuclear doctrine and its significance for strategic stability in South Asia which is challenged by complex interactions between different players in political, military, and technological dynamics. In particular, India's easy access to technology and the challenges for Pakistan associated with fears of low-intensity conflicts due to Indian offensive strategies have resulted in dangerous instabilities. The Indian technological advancement has inevitably brought revolutionary changes in the strategic thought process thus continuously forcing Pakistan to modify or upgrade its nuclear doctrine. We argue that Pakistan's nuclear doctrine is ambiguous, and the changing contours of Pakistan's nuclear doctrine are within the framework of how technological advancement navigates strategic stability in the South Asian region.

This paper assists in understanding contesting technological capabilities and doctrinal modification between India and Pakistan that are drifting South Asia towards instability, leaving the nuclear deterrence in a dark abyss. Hawks on both sides of the nuclear armed rivals are unprecedentedly chanting threats of nuclear war. More bothersome is the indications of shifting the Indian policy of No First Use (NFU), calls for doctrinal modifications and counterforce temptations. An Indian quest for escalation dominance and Pakistani quest for stability against India is in fact a mutual struggle beyond 'minimum credible' to 'assured second strike' capabilities.

This study was aimed to identify and examine the physical and geographical impediments to female higher education in the high mountainous rural Nagar district of Pakistan. District Nagar is one of the ten districts of Gilgit-Baltistan province located in the extreme north of Pakistan. The study adopted a descriptive research design. Both primary and secondary data were used for this study. A sum of 160 sample size comprised of female students, parents and teachers were purposively selected. Primary data was collected through a well-structured questionnaire from the field by interviewing 160 respondents and a five-point Likert scale was used to record the responses. While secondary data were retrieved from the literature review and government reports. The data was coded and analyzed with the help of excel sheet and presented in the form of charts and tables. The findings of the study revealed that lack of infrastructure, lack of transport services, the remoteness of education institutions and isolation from urban cities are the main physical and geographical impediments to female higher education in district Nagar. The researcher suggested that local and provincial governments should take some proactive steps to address the physical and geographical impediments to female higher education in the study area.